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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHANCE COLLAR, INC., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
LANE MURRAY, d.b.a. ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN SALES and SAMUEL C. 
THOMPSON, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 880455-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SAMUEL C. THOMPSON 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of a summary judgment entered in what was 
formerly the Seventh Judicial District Court of Uintah County, 
State of Utah, and which is now designated as the Eighth Judicial 
District Court of Uintah County, State of Utah. The Utah Supreme 
Court had original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3) (i) (1987) because the Court of Appeals does 
not have original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3 (1987). This Court currently has jurisdiction 
pursuant to a transfer of this case by the Supreme Court of Utah 
to this Court pursuant to the Supreme Court's authority to do so 
under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) and Rule 4A of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in granting plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment based upon the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel when a jury in a separate and distinct case found for an 
unrelated plaintiff which had brought suit on a separate and 
distinct transaction with the defendants? 
2. Did the trial court err in granting plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment based on a jury verdict in a separate case 
when the record in this case contains unresolved material issues 
of fact? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 56. Summary Judgment, 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The 
motion shall be served at least 10 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The 
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may 
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, 
may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Procedural History 
The plaintiff filed its original complaint seeking to 
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recover the purchase price of certain drill collars it delivered 
to defendant Lane Murray d.b.a. as Rocky Mountain Sales. (R. 1) 
(Drill collars are pieces of equipment used in drilling for oil.) 
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint joining as a 
defendant the appellant before this Court, Samuel Thompson. (R. 
21) The plaintiff alleged that Samuel Thompson acted in concert 
with the defendant Murray to commit fraud upon the plaintiff, and 
therefore, plaintiff was entitled to rescind the transaction at 
issue. To support this contention, the plaintiff alleged as 
follows: 
1. That Samuel Thompson gave representatives of the 
plaintiff false credit information about Lane Murray which 
induced the plaintiff to sell the drill collars to defendant 
Murray. (R. 22) 
2. That defendant Samuel Thompson took delivery of the 
equipment from defendant Murray and thereafter hid the 
equipment from the plaintiff and denied knowledge of its 
whereabouts. (R. 22) In addition, plaintiff alleged that 
defendant Samuel Thompson was attempting to alter or sell 
the drill collars. (R. 22) 
3. That defendant Samuel Thompson was not a bona fide 
purchaser of the collars. (R. 23) 
The defendant Samuel Thompson denied plaintiff's allegations 
and cross-claimed against defendant Lane Murray based upon the 
fact that he purchased the drill collars from Mr. Murray in good 
faith without the knowledge of plaintiff's claims and/or interest 
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therein and that he had fully paid for the collars, (R. 47) In 
the cross-claim, defendant Samuel Thompson sought relief from 
defendant Lane Murray should the Court find the plaintiff's 
interest in the drill collars superior to his. (R. 50) 
On May 21, 1984, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend the 
amended complaint to include a cause of action based on the Utah 
Fraudulent Conveyances Act and causes of action alleging 
violation of state and federal Racketeer Influence and Corrupt 
Organizations Acts. (R. 98) In addition, although there is no 
motion to consolidate with a supporting memorandum in the record, 
plaintiffs filed a reply memorandum in support of a motion to 
consolidate which indicates a request by the plaintiffs to 
consolidate this case with another case pending in Uintah County 
at that time, LOR, Inc. v. Lane Murray d.b.a. Rocky Mountain 
Sales and Samuel C. Thompson, Civil No. 12386. (hereinafter LOR) 
(R. 105) The plaintiff sought to consolidate these two cases 
because plaintiff claimed the questions of law and fact were 
identical in each, (R. 106) and therefore, under Rule 42 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, consolidation would be judicially 
and financially economical and efficient. (R. 106-107) 
The defendant Samuel Thompson requested the court dismiss 
both the motion to amend the complaint (R. 119) and the motion to 
consolidate. (R. 113) He argued that consolidation would be 
improper because the cases involved two separate plaintiffs, two 
independent transactions and factual scenarios, and two separate 
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claims for relief. (R. 123) The defendant also sought to 
dismiss plaintiff's motion to amend because there was no evidence 
of a violation of state or federal racketeering laws and to allow 
an amendment would substantially harm defendant and defendant's 
business. (R. 119) 
On July 29, 1984, the Honorable Richard C. Davidson denied 
both plaintiff's motion to consolidate the cases and the motion 
to amend the complaint. (R. 127) 
Thereafter, on March 29, 1985, the plaintiff filed a motion 
seeking summary judgment that defendant Samuel Thompson was not a 
good-faith purchaser of the drill collars, that the plaintiff had 
voidable title and was entitled to rescind the transaction with 
Lane Murray and take possession of the collars. (R. 146) This 
motion was based solely on the plaintiff's allegations that the 
issues had already been litigated in the LOR case, and therefore, 
pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, plaintiff Chance 
Collar was entitled to judgment as a matter of lav;. (R. 149-153) 
The defendant filed a memorandum in opposition stating that 
summary judgment would be inappropriate due to the fact that the 
LOR case involved separate parties, issues and facts and there 
were questions of fact in the record which precluded summary 
judgment. (R. 158-160) To support this position, an affidavit 
was filed by defendant Samuel Thompson that questioned the 
validity of certain evidence produced and relied upon by the 
plaintiff. (R. 161-162) In his affidavit, Samuel Thompson 
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denied giving false credit information to any agent of the 
plaintiff, and he also denied the validity of certain telephone 
records that plaintiff had produced in discovery• The plaintiff 
sought to use these telephone records to support its allegations 
that the defendant Samuel Thompson had talked to agents of the 
plaintiff on certain days and gave those agents false credit 
information on Lane Murray. However, as outlined in Samuel 
Thompson's affidavit, the calls at issue would have been 
impossible because he had suffered a fire in his shop which had 
destroyed phone service on the dates indicated in the phone 
records. (R. 161) These telephone records at issue were not 
part of the evidence or record in the LOR case, and therefore 
their validity and credibility has never been addressed by a 
finder of fact. 
After a request by Clark Allred, attorney for the plaintiff, 
for the court to rule on the motion for summary judgment, Judge 
Davidson granted plaintiff's motion in a Minute Entry dated 
September 9, 1985. (R. 178) 
Thereafter, on September 18, 1985, nine days after the 
Minute Entry indicates judgment was granted, counsel for the 
plaintiff submitted a memorandum of attached documents supporting 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 179) Included in this packet 
were certain documents from the LOR case including: 
1. The original complaint; 
2. A motion, stipulation and order to intervene as a 
defendant filed by Samuel C. Thompson; 
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3. Defendant Samuel Thompson's answer, counterclaim and 
cross-claim; 
4. The plaintiff LOR'S answer to the counterclaim; 
5. A 2-page minute entry outlining the sequence of events 
at the trial in the LOR case; 
6. The verdict form in the LOR case indicating that the 
plaintiff LOR was entitled to the drill collars and that 
defendant Samuel Thompson was not entitled to receive 
damages therefrom; 
7. The order and judgment on the verdict; and 
8. Copies of the jury instructions Nos. 10 through 20A. 
Thereafter, the court entered its written summary judgment 
on or about October 1, 1985. A copy of the judgment is included 
in the addendum to this brief as Exhibit "A". This summary 
judgment included certain findings of fact: 
1. The issues in the case of LOR, Inc. 
vs. Murray et al related to the ownership of 
certain drill collars. The issues were 
whether Defendant, Thompson, had acquired 
title to the drill collars as a good faith 
purchaser or had acquired the drill collars 
through fraud in concert with Defendant, 
Murray. 
2. The evidence presented in LOR, Inc. 
vs. Murray showed a common scheme whereby 
Defendants, Murray and Thompson, acquired 
both the LOR Inc. and the Chance Collar 
Company drill collars by fraud. Defendant, 
Thompson's claim for payment for both sets of 
drill collars was based on the same set of 
transactions. 
3. At the conclusion of the LOR case, 
the jury ruled in favor of LOR and against 
Defendant, Thompson. 
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4. The issues in this case, Chance 
Collar Company vs. Murray et al are identical 
to the issues adjudicated in LOR, Inc. vs. 
Murray et al. 
5. The jury, after hearing the 
evidence, ruled against Defendant, Thompson, 
in the LOR case finding he was not a good 
faith purchaser but had acquired the drill 
collars by fraud. Based on the jury verdict, 
a final judgment on the merits has been 
entered. 
6. Defendant, Samuel C. Thompson, in 
the LOR case is the same person as Samuel C. 
Thompson in this case. 
7. The issues presented in both the LOR 
case and this case were completely, fully and 
fairly litigated at the trial of the LOR 
case. Both parties were represented by their 
lawyers and evidence regarding both the LOR 
drill collars and the Chance Collar Company 
drill collars was presented showing the 
common fraudulent scheme of acquiring the 
drill collars by the Defendants. 
8. The affidavit submitted by 
Defendant, Thompson, in opposition to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment does not raise 
any material issues of fact as it relates to 
the defense of collateral estoppel. 
9. Based on the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
(R. 215-216) 
From these findings the court ordered that the plaintiff1s 
motion for summary judgment was granted and that the plaintiff 
was entitled to immediate possession of the 12 slick drill 
collars. (R. 216) The court went on to order Samuel Thompson to 
assist plaintiff in obtaining possession of them. (R. 216) The 
judgment dismissed the "counterclaim" [sic] of defendant Thompson 
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and reserved the issue of damages incurred by the plaintiff for 
two drill collars which were sold prior to the entry of the 
preliminary injunction in this matter. (R. 217) 
Defendant sought to appeal the entry of summary judgment, 
(R. 221) but the Utah Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as the 
trial court's decision was not a final decision for purposes of 
appeal under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Final Judgment was entered pursuant to stipulation of the parties 
on the reserved issues of damages and costs on June 21, 1988. 
(R. 255-257) Thereafter, the defendant filed its notice of this 
appeal on July 13, 1988. (R. 258) 
B. Issues of Fact in the Record 
The pleadings, affidavits, exhibits, and other documents, 
which comprise the record in this matter are replete with 
conflicting evidence on material issues of fact. These include, 
but may not be limited to the following: 
1. As to the issue of the date of sale and delivery of the 
drill collars at issue in this matter: 
a. The original complaint (R. 1) filed on or about 
September 23, 1983, and the amended complaint filed on or 
about February 24, 1984, (R. 21) claimed that the collars 
were sold the defendants on or about August 16, 1983. To 
support this allegations, the plaintiff attached an exhibit 
to both complaints which purports to be the invoice of the 
transaction. (R. 3 and 25) Although the date is illegible 
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on this Exhibit "A", it is assumed it would be August 16, 
1983. In addition, this Exhibit "A11 shows that a Mr. Jim 
Morris earned a $240.00 commission from Chance on each 
collar sold to Lane Murray. 
b. The affidavit of Wayne Robke (R. 29) submitted in 
support of plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining 
order and preliminary injunction also alleges the sale of 
the collars was on August 16, 1983, (R. 29) and that Lane 
Murray ordered the collars himself. (R. 29) 
c. However, the plaintiff's answers to request for 
admissions, interrogatories and requests for production of 
documents (R. 57-92) are not consistent with these 
allegations even though Wayne Robke is identified as the 
person answering them. (R. 57) These documents state that 
the collars were ordered on July 28, 1983, and delivered on 
August 3, 1983. (R. 58) Inconsistently with the notations 
on Exhibit "A" to the complaint that Jim Morris earned a 
commission on the sale at issue, the answers to 
interrogatories also state that Jim Morris is not employed 
by Chance Collar, but instead is believed to be an agent of 
Lane Murray. The answers go on to state that Mr. Morris 
ordered the drill collars from Chance as an agent for Lane 
Murray. (R. 59) 
d. Finally, the exhibit attached as Exhibit "A" to the 
answers to interrogatories which purports to be the sales 
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order and invoices for the collars is completely different 
than the invoice attached as Exhibit "A" to the complaint 
and amended complaint. Exhibit "A" to the answers is dated 
July 29, 1983. (R. 81) 
2. As to the central issue of the alleged fraudulent credit 
information given by Samuel Thompson: 
a. In his answer to the amended complaint, Samuel 
Thompson denies giving the plaintiff any credit information 
on Lane Murray. (R. 47) 
b. In Robke's affidavit, Mr. Robke states that Mr. 
Murray gave Mr. Thompson's name to Chance Collar as a credit 
reference and that agents of Chance Collar contacted Mr. 
Thompson and were given the fraudulent information. (R. 
29-30) 
c. In answering the interrogatories, however, Mr. 
Robke attaches an Exhibit "B" which indicates Mr. Morris 
gave Mr. Thompson's name to Chance Collar as a reference. 
(R. 90) Further contradictions arise as to whom Mr. Thompson 
was to have given the fraudulent credit information. First, 
in his answer to Interrogatory 7(d), Mr. Robke indicates 
that he was the person asking the questions regarding Mr. 
Murray's credit. (R. 61) Yet, in the answer to 
interrogatory 18, Mr. Robke indicates that Debye Morgan made 
initial contact with Sam Thompson on July 28 and a Mr. Hugh 
Vogel made follow-up contact on July 29. (R. 65) 
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d. Finally, although the plaintiff attaches telephone 
records to verify these allegations, Samuel Thompson's 
affidavit states that his phone number was (801) 789-7198 
and that there could not have been any calls to that number 
on the dates in question because a fire had destroyed phone 
service to his place of business on those days. (R. 
161-162) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I 
The trial court erred in applying the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel to grant plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in this 
matter for two reasons. First, the record in this case does not 
contain sufficient documentation from the case already litigated 
and relied upon by the plaintiffs to determine if the issues in 
this matter are identical to those in that case. Second, the 
pleadings, affidavits and other documents in this record indicate 
that, in fact, the contrary is true, and the issues in the two 
cases are not identical for purposes of applying collateral 
estoppel. 
II 
The trial court was precluded from granting plaintff's 
motion for summary judgment because the record in this matter 
contains material issues of fact, the determination of which is 
essential to the resolution of this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE 
DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO GRANT 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The theory and applicability of the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel was outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in Robertson v. 
Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983). In Robertson, the court 
stated: 
Collateral estoppel is a branch of what was 
once lumped with other rules under the 
general doctrine of res judicata. Collateral 
estoppel is distinct from the rules of bar 
and merger - other branches of res judicata -
in that it precludes relitigation only of 
issues actually tried in a prior action, and 
it may be invoked even though the subsequent 
cause of action is different from the former. 
Id. at 1230 (citations omitted) (Emphasis added and in original). 
The court went on to emphasize that lf[w]hat is critical is 
whether the issue that was actually litigated in the first suit 
was essential to resolution of that suit and is the same factual 
issue as that raised in the second suit." Id. (emphasis added). 
The test to determine if collateral estoppel applies was 
outlined by this Court of Appeals in Copper State Thrift & Loan 
v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387 (Utah App. 1987). In Bruno, this court 
stated: 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the 
following test to determine if collateral 
estoppel applies: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication identical with the one presented 
in the action in question? 
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2. Was there a final judgment on the 
merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea 
is asserted a party or in privity with a 
party to the prior adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case 
competently, fully, and fairly litigated? 
Id. at 389. (citing Searle Bros, v. Searlef 588 P.2d 689, 691 
(Utah 1978)). 
Applying these principals and elements of this test to the 
case currently on appeal, the trial court erred in granting 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel because the threshhold element of the test 
has simply not been met. There is no evidence in the Chance 
record that the issues decided in the LOR case were the same as 
the issues in this case. Because the two cases involved separate 
transactions, there would have had to be evidence in the Chance 
record that the jury in the LOR case heard evidence and found 
that fraudulent credit information was relayed by Samuel Thompson 
to a person acting on behalf of Chance. It is clear that the 
issue of fraudulent credit information to the agents of LOR is 
not the same issue as fraudulent credit information to agents of 
Chance. 
In addition, the issue of whether Lane Murray paid LOR for 
the drill collars delivered by LOR is not the same as whether 
Lane Murray paid Chance for separate drill collars delivered by 
Chance. Once again, there would have to have been evidence 
before the LOR jury as to nonpayment to Chance. 
14 
Although the plaintiff makes a bare, self-serving assertion 
in its memo in support of the motion that the issues were 
identical in the two cases, there is no independent evidence or 
documentation in the Chance record to support this claim. While 
the plaintiff submitted a memorandum of supporting documents from 
the LOR case, (R. 179) these documents were submitted nine days 
after Judge Davidson granted the motion for summary judgment as 
shown by the minute entry dated September 9, 1985. (R. 178) As a 
result, he could not have reviewed them prior to his decision. 
In addition, the documents attached do not contain information 
sufficient to determine if the issues were in fact identical in 
the two cases. There are no documents included indicating that 
findings of fact were made by the LOR jury and there is nothing 
to indicate what those findings were. Instead, the documents 
only show, in essence, the pleadings and the jury's verdict as 
to which party was entitled to possession of the drill collars at 
issue in the LOR case. 
Further, the LOR documents submitted in the Chance case do 
not contain anything to indicate that the LOR jury heard evidence 
on a common scheme of fraudulent activity or any evidence as to 
acquisition of the Chance collars by fraud. Even so, these two 
findings are set forth in the findings of fact in the Chance 
summary judgment. (R. 215) As there is no basis in the record to 
support such statements, summary judgment was inappropriate. 
Instead, in granting summary judgment and making the 
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findings of fact required to do so, Judge Davidson seems to rely 
on the fact that he presided at the LOR trial. (R. 214) This 
does not, however, provide an adequate basis to grant summary 
judgment as there is no independent evidence of the LOR findings 
of fact in the Chance record. As a result, any evidence of 
findings from the LOR case were not properly before Judge 
Davidson for his consideration. In addition, there is nothing in 
the record that the trier-of-fact in LOR even considered evidence 
pertaining to the defendant's transaction with this plaintiff, 
Chance Collar. Absent this independent documentation supporting 
plaintiff's bare assertion that the issues were identical and 
that the jury in the LOR case heard and considered the evidence 
to establish facts at issue in this case, the trial court erred 
in granting summary judgment based on collateral estoppel. 
Finally, not only is there no independent evidence in the 
record as to the similarity of the issues, the documentation in 
the Chance record indicates just the opposite -- that indeed the 
issues were not identical. First, the record shows the 
plaintiffs were in no way related and that they each completed 
separate transactions with Lane Murray for the sale of separate 
drill collars. Second, early in the case, the plaintiff made a 
motion to consolidate the Chance case with the LOR case based on 
the allegations that the legal and factual issues were identical. 
(R. 105-107) While this motion was denied, the subsequent 
summary judgment was granted on essentially the same basis. The 
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two rulings are inherently inconsistent. Third, there was 
evidence produced in the Chance case that was not produced in the 
LOR case. In Chance, the plaintiff sought to rely on telephone 
records as evidence to support its allegations that Samuel 
Thompson gave fraudulent credit information to agents of Chance. 
(R. 86-91) As these records were new evidence not before the LOR 
jury, and the validity and credibility of this evidence was at 
issue due to Samuel Thompson's affidavit, (R. 161) it was 
inappropriate to grant plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
Therefore, because the record is devoid of documentation to 
establish whether the issues in the LOR and Chance cases were 
identical and because the record does indicate that the cases do 
not have an identical set of issues, the first element of the 
test for collateral estoppel outlined in the Bruno case is not 
satisfied. Not having satisfied this initial element, the other 
three elements of the collateral estoppel test become irrelevant 
or inapplicable. As a result, collateral estoppel does not apply 
to this case, and the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment. It should be vacated by this court 
and the case should be remanded for further proceedings. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE 
RECORD ESTABLISHES UNRESOLVED MATERIAL ISSUES 
OF FACT PRECLUDING JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions 
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for summary judgment. Rule 56(c) sets forth the standard a 
moving party must establish to prevail on such a motion. It 
states, in pertinent part, that: lf[t]he judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." This language, of course, precludes summary 
judgment where there is a dispute as to material facts. (See 
Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977).) 
The guidelines for a court in approaching a motion for summary 
judgment were summarized by the Utah Supreme Court in Mountain 
States v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984), 
wherein the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
[U]nder Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P., summary 
judgment can be granted only if the record 
shows that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Doubts, uncertainties or inferences 
concerning issues of fact must be construed 
in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment. Litigants must be 
able to present their cases fully to the 
court before judgment can be rendered against 
them unless it is obvious from the evidence 
before the court that the party opposing 
judgment can establish no right to recovery. 
The trial court must not weigh evidence or 
assess credibility. 
Id. at 1261 (footnotes omitted). The Utah Supreme Court went on 
to state that, while findings and conclusions are unnecessary to 
support the granting of summary judgment, that remedy is 
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precluded where there are issues of fact inherent in the findings 
and conclusions. The court stated that "[t]he trial judge saw 
fit to make and enter findings and conclusions, the content of 
which evidence the existence of material issues of fact. 
Therefore, the grant of summary judgment is precluded." Id. 
In the case currently on appeal, the record is replete with 
evidence of material issues of fact such that the trial court 
erred in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. These 
issues include, but may not be limited to the following: 
1. Did Lane Murray purchase drill collars from plaintiff 
and fail to pay for them? 
a. The complaint (R. 1) and amended complaint (R. 21) 
allege the drill collars were purchased on August 16, 1983. 
To support this allegation, an invoice is attached to each 
as Exhibit "A". (R. 3 and 25) The answers to 
interrogatories state that the collars were purchased on 
July 28, 1983, and delivered on August 3, 1983. (R. 58) To 
support this answer, a completely different invoice is 
attached as Exhibit "A". (R. 81) 
b. Exhibit "A" to the complaint shows that Jim Morris 
earned a commission from Chance Collar on the sale of 
collars to Samuel Thompson. (R. 3) In the answers to 
interrogatories, plaintiff claims Jim Morris worked for Lane 
Murray and ordered the collars from Chance Collar. (R. 59) 
In his affidavit, Wayne Robke states that Lane Murray 
himself ordered the collars. (R. 29) 
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2. Did defendant Samuel Thompson give agents of Chance 
Collar Company fraudulent credit information about Lane Murray? 
a. Wayne Robke's affidavit states that defendant Lane 
Murray gave plaintiff the name of Samuel Thompson as a 
credit reference. (R. 29) In plaintiff's answers to 
interrogatories, Wayne Robke stated Jim Morris gave 
plaintiff the name of Samuel Thompson as a credit reference. 
(R. 90) 
b. In the answer to interrogatories, 7(b), Wayne 
Robke, answering for plaintiff, indicates that he solicited 
and obtained the credit information from Samuel Thompson. 
(R. 60) In the answer to interrogatory 18, Mr. Robke states 
that this information was given to Debye Morgan and Hugh 
Vogel. (R. 65) 
c. The plaintiff relies on telephone records to show 
that agents of plaintiff talked to Samuel Thompson on 
certain days and received the information at issue. 
However, in his affidavit, Samuel Thompson stated that the 
calls at issue could not have been made as a fire had 
interrupted phone service to his shop on the days at issue. 
(R. 162) Also, in the affidavit he again denies that he 
gave any credit information on Lane Murray to plaintiff at 
any time. 
These examples of conflicting evidence in the record before the 
Chance court establish that there are issues of fact in this 
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matter essential to resolution of this case. In addition, as 
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the trial court in the summary judgment. 
In addition, summary judgment was precluded in this matter 
due to the existence of material issues of fact which are central 
to the resolution of this matter. These issues include whether 
or not Samuel Thompson gave fraudulent credit information to the 
plaintiff's agents, and this issue is the primary basis upon 
which relief was granted to plaintiffs in summary judgment. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment and this court should vacate this 
judgment and remand this case for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of November, 1988. 
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS 
JOHN C. GREEtf (USB# 1242) 
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